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Abstract
In 2017, at a time when the EU was experiencing a triple crisis, the European Commission pub-
lished a White Paper containing ﬁve scenarios outlining potential ways out of it. In his State of
the Union address Commission President Juncker added a sixth. Although the Commission refers
to fundamental values it neglects gender equality and reduces equality to the harmonization of the
quantity of ﬁsh in ﬁsh ﬁngers and EU-wide access to vaccination against measles. Despite the ne-
glect of gender equality, the scenarios are not gender neutral. A feminist institutionalist analysis
unpacks the potential direct and indirect positive and negative gendered consequences of each sce-
nario and illuminates how the choice of scenario makes a difference as to their gendered impacts
and as to the access for feminist actors to bring gender issues to the table.
Keywords: European Commission; gender equality; White Paper; feminist institutionalism; impact as-
sessment; crisis
Since 2008 the EU has been struggling with several crises simultaneously and seems to be
in a state of malaise. The ﬁnancial crisis starting in the USA hit the eurozone hard and
turned into a public debt crisis, placing some countries on the brink of collapse. The
EU responded with austerity policies, which for people in Greece and elsewhere caused
employment losses and pension cuts. Since 2010, the sudden increase in the number of
refugees trying to enter the EU and the inadequacy of EU policies to govern migration
triggered another crisis. Murderous attacks in Paris, Nice, Brussels and Berlin convinced
many Europeans that the EU was unable to defend their interests properly. Anger and fear
found an outlet in support for extremist and eurosceptic parties. This so-called legitimacy
crisis culminated in the UK in the referendum on 23 June 2016, when the majority of
voters opted for Brexit. While the crises already constituted a push for change, the British
decision made reﬂection on EU integration imperative. Thus, it constituted a critical junc-
ture; an event provoking the destabilization of institutions (Waylen, 2009, p. 249).
Against this turbulent background, in March 2017 the European Commission pub-
lished a long-awaited proposal for renewing the EU; the White Paper ‘The future of
Europe – Reﬂections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025’ (European Commission,
2017a). It proposed ﬁve scenarios as possible paths for the EU integration process, which
were elaborated in ﬁve reﬂection papers (European Commission, 2017c–2017g). In his
‘State of the Union 2017’ address, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker proudly
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added a sixth, a ‘personal’ scenario (European Commission, 2017b). Strikingly, the sce-
narios do not address the issue of gender equality, ‘as if gender were not relevant to them’
(Walby, 2018, p. 316). In the sixth scenario, equality tout court is addressed in internal
market terms as a problem of differing quantities of ﬁsh in ﬁsh ﬁngers and unequal access
to measles vaccines (European Commission, 2017b). Of course, given the open, ‘thought-
provoking’ character of the White Paper and its limited length, other themes are also
poorly elaborated, such as research and development, sustainability, climate change and
digitalization, but the absence of gender equality merits special attention for several
reasons.
Firstly, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the EU is simply
obliged to take into account gender effects of all its activities.1 Secondly, the triple crisis
has clear gendered dimensions that undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of future
EU policies if they are not addressed. Austerity policies have hit men and women differ-
ently, depending on national gender regimes and the gender segregation of employment
(Kantola and Lombardo, 2017; Karamessini and Rubery, 2014; Walby, 2015). Not only
are women more likely to be in precarious employment than men, but the reduction of
the welfare state also has increased their burden of unpaid household work (Bruff and
Wöhl, 2016). Governance of the refugee crisis has been characterized by a security-dom-
inated approach based on stereotyped ideas of masculinity and femininity that constitute
male migrants as a threat and female migrants as victims (Freedman, 2017). The wide-
spread lack of conﬁdence in EU governance, known as the legitimacy crisis, has induced
far more men than women to vote for eurosceptic radical right parties (Spierings and
Zaslove, 2017), as was testiﬁed by the Brexit campaign and its aftermath as well
(Guerrina and Masselot, 2018). Thirdly, gender equality and non-discrimination are
proclaimed as foundational values2 of the EU. In several member states, however, gender
equality, sexual and reproductive rights and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights
are threatened by state and non-state actors (Kuhar and Paternotte, 2017; Verloo, 2018).
Moreover, the gender equality index shows that gender equality is far from being reached
and in 2017, 12 member states even have regressed.3 In spite of these compelling reasons
for taking gender seriously, the White Paper scenarios are gender-blind. While some fem-
inist scholars would argue that this conﬁrms that EU gender equality policies are being
dismantled (Jacquot, 2015, p. 137), even calling it a U-turn (Karamessini and Rubery
2014, p. 333), others claim that the EU gender equality project has always alternated be-
tween progress and stagnation (Debusscher and Van der Vleuten, 2017; Weiner and
Macrae, 2016). In the light of this discussion, how can we make sense of the six
scenarios?
The article has two ambitions; to show empirically how apparently gender-blind policy
ideas affect the prospects of gender equality, and to explore theoretically the extent to
which a feminist institutionalist lens may be useful for understanding the implications
for the gender equality of future plans. We ﬁrst present our theoretical perspective and
formulate questions that guide our empirical analysis. Next, we turn to the scenarios,
1Article 3(2), Treaty of Amsterdam: ‘In all the activities referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to eliminate
inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women’.
2The other foundational values – human dignity and human rights, freedom, democracy and the rule of law – are not pri-
mary law and we would therefore not necessarily expect their inclusion.
3For details see http://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/about. Last accessed 7 May 2018.
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focusing ﬁrst on the problem deﬁnition of the White Paper and then on the potential gen-
dered impacts of the solutions it proposes as well as the access they offer to feminist ac-
tors. We conclude by tentatively explaining the sidelining of gender equality in the
Commission documents.
I. A Feminist Institutionalist Lens
All institutionalists agree that formal and informal institutions matter: they set incentives
and disincentives for actor’s behaviour (rational institutionalism), constrain actors’
choices (historical institutionalism), shape their notions of appropriate conduct (sociolog-
ical institutionalism) and are internalized (discursive institutionalism) (Weiner and
MacRae, 2017). Mainstream institutionalists have engaged extensively with the EU and
EU policymaking (for an overview, see Jupille and Caporaso, 1999). However, they have
not recognized that gender is ‘profoundly entangled in institutions’ (Weiner and Macrae,
2017, p. xx). Feminist institutionalism adds an awareness of the gendered nature of
institutions and institutionalized power relations to explain how ‘formal and informal
institutional mechanisms, rules, values, and norms reconstruct and reinforce gender
inequality’ (MacRae and Weiner, 2017a, p. 208). When referring to gendered effects,
feminist institutionalism analyses how an institutional arrangement has different conse-
quences for men’s and women’s lives, and often privilege either men’s or women’s inter-
ests (Gains and Lowndes, 2014). In our analysis, however, rather than conceptualizing
women and men as two homogenous groups we acknowledge that EU governance can
exacerbate or tackle inequalities selectively at the intersections of gender, class, race/eth-
nicity and sexual orientation. Verloo and Walby (2012) call this complex gender equality;
the complex conceptualization of multiple inequalities and their intersections. Where we
refer to gender equality we mean complex gender equality (see also MacRae and Weiner,
2017a, p. 209).
In this article we use feminist institutionalism in an innovative way by hypothesizing
the gendered effects of future EU institutions and policies instead of examining them after
their adoption. Hence, we stretch feminist institutionalism by focusing on potential gen-
dered outcomes. To show how gender is implicated in the scenarios, we relied on the four
dimensions identiﬁed by Gains and Lowndes (2014, p. 527): (1) rules about gender
(equality), (2) rules that are not speciﬁcally about gender but have gendered conse-
quences, (3) gendered rule makers and (4) gendered policy outcomes. However, we had
to adapt our feminist institutionalism analysis in several ways. For the ﬁrst dimension,
in the absence of explicit attention to gender equality in the scenarios, we could not
examine new formal rules. Hence, we evaluated the potential consequences for existing
policies like the gender mainstreaming obligation, directives and soft law; in other words,
their path-dependency. Also, we assessed whether and how the scenarios deal with mul-
tiple inequalities or target speciﬁc groups of people. For the second dimension, we ex-
pected that rules that are not speciﬁcally about gender equality may have gendered
effects because they interact with institutions governing the economy, ﬁnance, welfare,
security and violence. Here we wanted to know how the scenarios relate to enshrined gen-
der biases in these institutions. Klatzer and Schlager (2017) have identiﬁed several
interlinked biases in macroeconomic governance, most notably the deﬂationary bias,
which refers to policies giving low inﬂation and ﬁscal restraint priority over public
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spending, thereby constraining distributive and redistributive policies. Concomitantly, the
governance of security and violence displays a state-centred bias when it prioritizes the
security of state borders over human security, and it displays a gender bias when issues
such as gender-based violence and stereotyped masculinity are not considered to be part
of security concerns (Muehlenhoff, 2017). The third dimension brings in agency. The rule
makers, their gendered identities, and the shifting balance of inﬂuence between feminist
and other actors shape gender equality institutions and policies. Gains and Lowndes
(2014, p. 529) rightly warn against an essentialist focus on the sex of actors, because
‘[f]emale actors may adopt masculine styles and/or pursue non- or antifeminist goals
(the “Thatcher counterfactual”)’ while ‘male “critical actors” can act for women’. Hence,
assessing the plurality of interests represented in the rulemaking process and the access it
offers to a plurality of voices is more relevant than identifying the sex of the rule makers.
For the fourth dimension, we hypothesized the gendered policy outcomes shaped by the
rules and previous paths in policymaking. Of course, feminist institutionalism has not
been conceived as forecasting tool, but given its strength in unpacking path-dependencies
we considered it eligible for extrapolation. To this effect, we utilized a classic from the
gender mainstreaming tool box, gender impact assessments,4 for forecasting their poten-
tial effects for complex gender equality. We merged core steps from Verloo and
Roggeband (1996) and the European Institute for Gender Equality (2016) into guiding
questions that allowed us to address the dimensions of feminist institutionalism and their
extrapolation:
1 How is the problem of the future of Europe constructed and how is this gendered?
2 How are the proposed solutions to the problem constructed and how are they
gendered?
3 Who is or will be involved in rulemaking? Who has access/voice, who is sidelined?
4 What direct and indirect, positive and negative gendered impacts can we expect?
These questions are answered by doing a document analysis of the White Paper on the
Future of the European Union, the reﬂection papers and the sixth scenario of President
Juncker’s State of the Union 2017. According to the EU glossary, ‘European Commission
White Papers are documents containing proposals for European Union (EU) action in a
speciﬁc area’.5 We understand the various scenarios in this logic, even though the
‘speciﬁc area’ is the future EU governance structure itself. Given the sketchy style of
the scenarios, we have opted for extending the assessment to the accompanying reﬂection
papers which offer more in-depth coverage than the scenarios themselves. They were
published in May–June 2017. Four of them present policy options in speciﬁc domains;
namely the social dimension, globalization, economic and monetary integration, and de-
fence (European Commission, 2017c–f). Some directly refer to the White Paper scenarios
while others take a more general approach to their topic. The ﬁfth reﬂection paper details
the budgetary consequences for each of the scenarios (European Commission, 2017g).
4Since 1996 the Commission has institutionalized impact assessments (IA), resulting in 2002 in integrated IA guidelines
that measure the likely economic, social and environmental consequences of legislative initiatives, and since 2009 of
non-legislative initiatives, including white papers (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2016; Radaelli and Meuwese,
2010). However, no IA exists for the 2017 White Paper.
5See online glossary https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary.html, Last accessed 25 April, 2018.
Petra Ahrens and Anna van der Vleuten4
© 2019 The Authors JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Building on secondary literature, we assessed the possible gendered impact by contrasting
the history of EU gender equality policy with the content of the Commission documents.
The following section deals with the ﬁrst question. It unpacks the gendered character
of the construction of the future of European integration as a problem and hence provides
us with the underlying rationale of the scenarios. This is where we stretched feminist in-
stitutionalism, as it normally does not ask for a diagnosis. We considered the diagnosis
(problem deﬁnition) as the master frame that allows for policy proposals only within
the deﬁned frame. We then answered the second and fourth question for each scenario,
also referring to the corresponding sections in the reﬂection papers. Finally, the third
question is addressed in a separate section for all scenarios jointly.
II. The Construction of the Future of the EU as a Problem
Taking the introduction to the White Paper (European Commission, 2017a, pp. 6–14) as
the problem deﬁnition, the future of Europe (sic) is considered to be in dire straits for sev-
eral reasons. We summarize them in four main points and reﬂect on the underlying values
and how they are gendered.
Firstly, the relative weight of Europe in the world is shrinking (its population share,
economic power, and the euro as global currency), which the White Paper considers prob-
lematic in the light of the rising inﬂuence of emerging economies. This worldview typi-
cally conﬂates size and inﬂuence and reﬂects a tenet of hegemonic masculinity by
reducing international politics to patterns of rivalry and zero-sum games as if this is the
only game in town. Secondly, the global context is described as increasingly tense be-
cause of war and terrorism in the Middle East, Africa and at the eastern borders of the
EU, and due to increasing militarization around the world. The White Paper warns that
Europe is unable to take care of its security because it is weak on hard power, which is
indispensable ‘when force can prevail over rules’ (European Commission, 2017a, p. 9).
The White Paper dismisses soft power as less useful, and hence presents militarization
as the problem as well as the solution, again reproducing hegemonic masculinity. Another
security concern relates to migration, especially in the light of a further increase in the
number of refugees due to ‘population growth, widespread tensions and climate change’
(European Commission, 2017a, p. 11). Migration is framed as a security issue rather than
a humanitarian one connected with EU fundamental values. Thirdly, Europe is said to be
in a process of profound transformation, which is problematic in so far as the social mar-
ket economy is not well adapted yet. Many member states are already struggling with
long-term and youth unemployment and high levels of public and private debt; also, in
the light of ageing population and the ﬂexibilization of work, social protection systems
will become unaffordable unless they are modernized. The working-age population is
shrinking, some regions are suffering from a brain drain and not all talent is mobilized.
This is the only place where the text refers to gender equality, stating: ‘There are more
women in work than ever before but achieving real gender equality will mean breaking
down persisting barriers’ (European Commission, 2017a, p. 9). The entire section reﬂects
liberal ideas of a workforce that should be well equipped to ﬁt the needs of the economy,
and of a society in which inequalities can be dealt with by applying the right incentives.
To women it gives a double message: women are talents whose potential should be better
mobilized to keep the economy aﬂoat, and women face structural obstacles to ‘real’ (sic)
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gender equality, which should be eliminated. However, what exactly these obstacles are
and how they should be removed is not further addressed. Fourthly, EU citizens suffer
from insecurity, which is problematic because it undermines the legitimacy of national
and European politics and increases euroscepticism. They simply lack awareness of the
EU’s positive impact on their daily life. This diagnosis reﬂects the rather elitist idea that
citizens do not understand what is good for them, and that communication is the problem,
not European politics themselves. All in all, the future of the EU is constructed as threat-
ened by emerging economies, militarization, migration, the lack of competitiveness and
uncomprehending citizens. As this diagnosis is predominately gender-blind, the scenarios
can be expected to relegate gender equality to the margins as well. Which solutions are
considered appropriate in the light of this problem deﬁnition?
III. Forecasting the Gendered Impact of the Scenarios
The White Paper proposes ﬁve scenarios that lay out different integration paths instead of
conveying a clear preference, although this ‘is more in line with the consultative approach
of a Green, rather than a White Paper’ (Begg, 2017, p. 1). Scenario 1, ‘Carrying on’, pro-
poses the pursuit of the reform agenda presented in the 2014 Commission’s ‘New Start
for Europe’ and the 2016 Bratislava Declaration about the EU without the UK, with no
further attempts to reform decision-making. The ‘Nothing but the single market’ in
scenario 2 suggests a focus on economic integration only, signiﬁcantly reducing the
regulatory burden, while abstaining from cooperating in other policy areas such as migra-
tion or security. Scenario 3, ‘Those who want more do more’ speaks to the idea of a var-
iable geometry when a ‘coalition of the willing’ can decide to collaborate more closely in
a speciﬁc policy area, comparable to the Schengen area or the eurozone. Scenario 4,
‘Doing less more efﬁciently’, recommends choosing priority areas such as trade, border
management or migration where the EU could move forward quickly while doing less
or even abstaining from action in the remaining areas. With ‘Doing much more together’,
scenario 5 adds a perspective where cooperation between member states could go further
than ever before with speedier supranational decision-making procedures. In the ‘State of
the Union Address 2017’ President Juncker presents a sixth scenario that combines ele-
ments from the different scenarios, depending on the policy area. He supplements it by
discussing values, unity and the rule of law (European Commission, 2017b). We discuss
the reﬂection papers in connection with the scenarios as far as a link could be established.
Scenario 1: ‘Carrying On’ – Stagnation or Decline
This scenario of the ‘status quo and muddling through’ (Begg, 2017, p. 2) does not
mention equality, non-discrimination or gender equality. Some apparently gender-neutral
elements, however, merit further reﬂection. The scenario warns that outdated legislation
will be withdrawn. This was already the case for the maternity leave directive, which
was not updated but withdrawn by the Commission in an unprecedented manner
(Ahrens and Abels, 2017). The 2008 ‘Draft directive on implementing the principle of
equal treatment outside the labour market, irrespective of age, disability, sexual orienta-
tion or religious belief’ remains blocked by the Council, as has the 2012 ‘Draft directive
on gender balance among non-executive directors of companies listed on stock ex-
changes’. In scenario 1, one can expect that these drafts will suffer the same fate as the
maternity leave directive. Furthermore, the scenario promises a continued focus on jobs,
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growth and investment by strengthening the single market. This focus, characterized by a
deﬂationary bias, has proven ineffective in promoting gender equality, not least because
rules on gender equality were eradicated step by step from the European employment
strategy (Hubert, 2012) and have been subordinated to ﬁscal and monetary objectives
(Jacquot, 2015). EU austerity policies have legitimized cuts in public spending, (re)creat-
ing as a result a gendered division of labour (Kantola and Lombardo, 2017; Karamessini
and Rubery, 2014; Walby, 2015). European social policy promotes work–life balance but
only under the umbrella of growth and not equality (Stratigaki, 2012). The scenario men-
tions ‘investment in digital, transport and energy infrastructure’ (European Commission,
2017a, p. 16), yet omits the care infrastructure in spite of its relevance in an ageing soci-
ety. The scenario reduces migration policies to an issue of border management and disre-
gards the way that stereotyped notions of masculinity exacerbate the securitization of
migrants, as is typical for a gendered, state-centred bias. Here, gender mainstreaming
would mean unpacking such stereotypes and discussing, for instance, the EU’s take on
family reuniﬁcation for refugees as well as the protection of homosexual, transgender
and intersex persons inside and outside the EU.
The reﬂection papers offer additional insights. The social dimension reﬂection paper
discusses inequalities between member states as regards income and employment rates,
inequalities between generations, and the persistence of signiﬁcant gender gaps and ste-
reotypes in the labour market and in economic and political decision-making positions
(European Commission, 2017g, p. 15). However, this gender-sensitive diagnosis is not
followed by a strategy to ﬁght structural inequalities and stereotypes. As regards the ques-
tion who should act, the member states remain ﬁrmly in the driver’s seat, enabling them to
continue blocking progress, while the Commission limits itself to offering guidance and
strengthening collaboration with social partners. It comes as a positive surprise that the
reﬂection paper on EU ﬁnances makes provisions for funding social inclusion and em-
ployment, and links positive incentives to the European semester.
Scenario 2: ‘Nothing But the Single Market’ – Backtracking?
The second scenario omits (gender) equality in the text, but the reﬂection papers on the
social dimension and the future of EU ﬁnances speak directly to rules on gender when
stating that in this scenario equality legislation will be abolished, the equal treatment of
part-time workers will no longer be ensured and there will no longer be minimum
standards at EU-level for maternity and paternity leave or for parental or carers leave
(European Commission, 2017c, p. 26). Moreover, programmes for research and innova-
tion as well as for ‘aid to the most deprived, health, culture, citizenship, etc.’ will be
discontinued (European Commission, 2017g, p. 32). Clearly, the gendered policy out-
come will be negative. The White Paper warns of a race to the bottom and correctly notes
that this scenario will most likely lead to a reduction in regulation, with the effect that
‘differences persist or increase in areas such as consumer, social and environmental stan-
dards’ (European Commission, 2017a, p. 18). The focus on a single market without reg-
ulation will exacerbate inequalities between and within states along the intersections of
class, race and gender. In other words, the success of supranational gender equality will
be reversed (Walby, 2015). Not only will the EU be reluctant to initiate new rules on gen-
der equality, the scenario even calls for deregulation by withdrawing two existing pieces
of legislation for every new proposal. As a contrasting perspective, the scenario could re-
sult in improvements if re-centring on the single market pushed the EU to follow its treaty
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obligations more strictly, including gender mainstreaming. This would require a complete
make-over of the single market as the EU would have to scrutinize and adjust all macro-
economic policies so that their negative effects on gender equality would be corrected.
However, this reading seems highly unlikely given the deregulatory logic of the scenario.
Scenario 3: ‘Those Who Want More Do More’ – Selective Upgrading?
Explicit rules or statements on (gender) equality are lacking in this scenario as well,
and the reﬂection papers add little in the way of additional features. In general, scenario
3 muddles through like the ﬁrst one, but it offers the option for groups of member states
to step up cooperation. Leaving aside the question of how this could be institutionalized,
considering the role of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice,
upgrading would offer promising options for promoting gender equality if a ‘coalition
of the willing’ (European Commission, 2017a, p. 20) agreed on common, new and high
social standards. This might include harmonizing parental leave, maternity leave, quota
laws, marriage equality or social rights for domestic workers at an advanced level but also
it could also include effectively tackling gender gaps in pay, pensions and leisure time
(Plomien, 2018). Given the increased divergence in the EU since the economic and ﬁnan-
cial crisis, it might indeed be easier to ﬁnd common ground with a small groups of like-
minded member states. Furthermore, in the past pioneer states have played a key role in
advancing gender equality policies, especially when the Commission put strong proposals
on the table and was pushed by a strong transnational mobilization in favour of gender
equality (Van der Vleuten, 2007). Scenario 3 could enable a pioneer alliance to circum-
vent resistance from the laggard states. However, if, in an integrated market, a subgroup
of member states adopted high social standards, this would make them expensive and
hence less attractive for business. The reﬂection paper on the social dimension recognizes
this problem. It envisions deepening the social dimension in the eurozone, motivated by
the desire to be better prepared ‘when the next crisis hits’ (European Commission, 2017g,
p. 28), but acknowledges that countries outside the eurozone could attract business by de-
liberately lowering their standards, making it even more costly for the others to invest in
upgrading. As a result, selective upgrading would increase inequalities between and
within member states. Regarding gendering security policies, scenario 3 would enable
concerted action by committed member states on trafﬁcking and prostitution and could
integrate the ﬁght against gender-based violence in any strategy against organized crime
and terrorism or information exchange on this matter. However, in spite of the cross-bor-
der character of these issues, member states continue to be reluctant to relinquish their
sovereignty in these ﬁelds (Askola, 2007).
Scenario 4: ‘Doing Less More Efﬁciently’ – Sidestepping
The fourth scenario points in a similar direction as the second. It proposes a focus on a
reduced number of areas, allowing the EU to stop acting in others. The overall budget will
be reduced. The scenario does not mention (rules on) gender equality,and thus its effects
on gender equality depend largely on which policy areas will be included in or excluded
from further EU action, and whether gender mainstreaming is implemented in each ac-
tion. Begg (2017) expects the EU to play much-reduced role in employment and social
policy, because the scenario suggests excluding domains ‘such as regional development,
public health, or parts of employment and social policy not directly related to the func-
tioning of the single market’ (European Commission, 2017a, p. 22). Narrowing the focus
of EU activities bodes ill for existing gendered inequalities in the EU between and within
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states, because common standards will likely be set at a minimum level and different
salaries and social legislation will continue to vary signiﬁcantly across Europe
(Plomien, 2018). Over the decades, the reduction of EU gender equality policies to single
market corrections was much criticized, for instance, for restricting the ﬁght against gen-
der-based violence to non-binding recommendations, while the only binding instrument
was on sexual harassment in the workplace and could be motivated only by the argument
that a harassed worker is less productive (Elman, 1996). Moreover, the European Com-
mission had to legitimize funding for anti-trafﬁcking projects with a reference to public
health for lack of a more appropriate treaty base (Van der Vleuten, 2007). As the scenario
proposes to abstain from further EU action in the realm of health, this will further limit
activities combatting gender-based violence. On the other hand, the scenario favours a fo-
cus on ‘excellence in R&D’, which might bring positive results in attention to gender (in)
equalities in EU-funded research, depending however on how excellence is deﬁned and
measured (Abels, 2012).
Scenario 5: ‘Doing Much More Together’ – Deepening
The ﬁfth scenario also makes no reference to (gender) equality. Again, its effects de-
pend largely on whether the EU takes its treaty obligations seriously and undertakes a co-
ordinated effort to implement gender mainstreaming in all policy ﬁelds, institutions, and
governance levels. ‘Doing much more together’ would probably lead to the most positive
effects for gender equality. It would allow for the further institutionalization of policy
ideas that exist already in the form of soft law, or the reactivation of previous gender
equality tools such as the policy programmes that existed since the 1980s and recently lost
their legal status (Ahrens 2018, 2019). The same applies to introducing new measures
such as gendering taxation, which would reﬂect how unpaid work contributes to the gross
domestic product, and gender budgeting, an approach favoured by the European Parlia-
ment that allows us to assess the implications of budget allocations, taxation and eco-
nomic policies on gender equality (Beveridge and Cengiz, 2015; Klatzer and Schlager,
2017). Theoretically, the ﬁfth scenario could revive gender mainstreaming and gender
budgeting for all EU legislation and policies. However, in order for such a revival to
materialize, there should be consensus among the member states that the EU should
act. Such consensus seems hard to ﬁnd, given the contestation over gender, sexual and
reproductive rights, and minority rights in a number of member states (Kuhar and
Paternotte, 2017; Verloo, 2018). Here, the reﬂection paper on deepening and completing
the economic and monetary union acknowledges that during the crisis the eurozone
did not deliver on the promise of prosperity, stability and protection for all. As a result,
social and economic divergences between and within eurozone members increased
and political trust diminished (European Commission, 2017d, p. 7). The paper suggests
deepening the EMU because it could contribute to ‘[j]obs, growth, social fairness, eco-
nomic convergence and ﬁnancial stability’ (European Commission, 2017d, p. 18) – def-
initely a more encompassing mission than the traditional focus on price stability. Yet
the means proposed to attain these objectives remain limited to the reinforcement of
coordinating national policies as part of the European semester. The reﬂection paper does
not deal with persistent criticisms of the opacity of decision-making on monetary and
macroeconomic issues. As decision-making powers remain with the European Central
Bank and the ministers of the Eurogroup, effective oversight by any parliament is
precluded.
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The reﬂection paper on harnessing globalization pleads for inclusive growth so the EU
can deal with globalization more successfully than it does now. It stresses the need for tax
policies that address inequalities, the unequal distribution of the beneﬁts of globalization
coupled with effective social protection and focused investments to foster social inclusion
of vulnerable groups of people including migrants (European Commission, 2017c, p. 16).
Its recommendations read like a shopping list for the establishment of an EU-wide welfare
state, including measures to raise the labour market participation of women and the pro-
motion of work–life balance, while also reiterating the need to make the EU a more com-
petitive and innovative economy. However, no supra-nationalization is foreseen, as ‘the
centre of gravity for action in the social ﬁeld should and will always remain with national
and local authorities and their social partners’ (European Commission, 2017g, p. 20). The
reﬂection paper on the future of ﬁnances adds that the EU should invest in people ‘from
education and training, to health, equality and social inclusion’ and that existing criteria
for social spending may need to be revisited to ‘reach those that most need it, particularly
in regions with high social inequalities’ (European Commission, 2017f, p. 22). However,
if the EU27 were to meet these aims, they would have to agree on expanding the EU bud-
get, which seems highly unlikely as they already have to compensate for the loss of the
UK contribution to the budget, estimated at €10 billion per year (European Council,
2018). Scenario 5 would also aim at developing cooperation in matters of security and de-
fence, resulting in the EU speaking ‘with one voice’ (European Commission, 2017a, p.
25). This voice, according to the reﬂection paper on European defence, aims to protect cit-
izens against terrorist strikes, cyber-attacks and energy-security related threats (European
Commission, 2017e). However, it does not refer to the broad concept of human security,
gender-based violence and trafﬁcking, nor does it gender other threats to the safety of cit-
izens, for instance, by elaborating the conceptualization of masculinity and terrorism.
Scenario 6: State of the Union – Equality Tout Court
The sixth scenario implicitly provides several options for promoting gender equality.
Indeed, in their analysis of the 2017 State of the Union address, Pansardi and
Battegazzorre (2018) ﬁnd that it refers relatively often to social and ethical values
(although this is surpassed by references to political values such as democracy, transpar-
ency and accountability). However, President Juncker surprisingly did not address the
promotion of gender equality despite his strong emphasis on freedom, equality and the
rule of law as ‘unshakeable’ principles (European Commission, 2017b). Likewise, his
praise of the 2018 European Year of Cultural Heritage and the ‘celebration of cultural di-
versity’ did not result in valuing gender, ethnic or sexual diversity. Overall, his speech re-
duces equality to one between nationals from different countries who deserve equal
treatment in the internal market. Strikingly, in 1957 this standpoint led to anchoring equal
pay for women and men in the Treaty of Rome. It also enabled non-discrimination to be-
come a fundamental EU principle, because in an internal market, there can be no unequal
treatment of persons based on nationality or other grounds (Van der Vleuten, 2007).
Nonetheless, Juncker does not apply the non-discrimination principle to inequalities be-
tween groups within and across countries, for instance between Roma and non-Roma, les-
bians, gays and hetero people, transgender and cisgender people, people of colour and
white people, people with and without a migration background. He states that ‘there
can be no second class citizens’ and talks about avoidable deaths and measles vaccination
across Europe without referring to avoidable deaths by combating gender-based and racist
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violence.6 In a similar manner, when stating that ‘there can be no second class workers’,
Juncker does not refer to the gender pay gap, which is the oldest EU gender equality issue,
but to equal pay for posted workers. In other words, it is framed as an issue of free move-
ment, not as one of social and gender justice. Juncker’s ﬁnal equality claim is that ‘there
can be no second class consumers’. Here, he uses the example of Slovakians who have
less ﬁsh in their ﬁsh ﬁngers than consumers elsewhere in the EU. This rather narrow ap-
proach to inequalities between consumers is understandable in the light of Slovakian com-
motion over the issue, but is ridiculous in the light of the rise in inequality in income and
purchasing power since 2008 (Eurostat, 2017). On a positive note, Juncker proposed es-
tablishing a common labour authority comparable to the European banking authority.
Such an institution could have a positive effect on gender equality if gender
mainstreaming becomes an obligation for the new authority, while ensuring effective
and consistent prudential regulation and supervision of labour conditions across the EU,
as the European banking authority does for banking – presuming it would have the power
to combat discrimination, gendered pay differences, unequal treatment in paternity, mater-
nity and pension schemes and similar issues. Juncker also emphasizes the need to combat
social fragmentation and social dumping in Europe by strengthening the European pillar
of social rights through agreements on European social standards – a hopeful connection,
because the social pillar includes a number of gender equality aspects (Plomien, 2018).
IV. Who Has Voice and Who Should Act?
Our third question regards the actors involved. We lack detailed information about the au-
thors involved in drafting the White Paper. The document has been presented as ‘the
Commission’s contribution’ and President Juncker has committed all commissioners to
defending the White Paper in ‘debates with the public’ (European Commission, 2017b).
Countering criticisms on the lack of transparency and responsiveness of the EU, the Com-
mission organized over 2,000 public events across Europe after the publication of the
White Paper and continues to hold such ‘citizens dialogues’ (European Commission,
2017b). These dialogues mostly take place in universities and high schools and the audi-
ence is mainly composed of students. As a result, the debates suffer from an underrepre-
sentation of less-educated and ethnic minority citizens, and an overrepresentation of
young, white and highly educated citizens.7 Given high levels of euroscepticism amongst
older and less-educated citizens, the debates therefore may fail to give voice to those who
mistrust European institutions to defend their interests. As the events do not discuss the
scenarios, it remains unclear how they will contribute to future policymaking.
In all these scenarios, the main addressees and actors are the member states, such as the
EU27, small coalitions of the willing or national policymakers. Although subsidiarity is
not mentioned, all scenarios include an option to renationalize policies or leave it to na-
tional governments to act, and all scenarios (except the ﬁfth) shift the balance of inﬂuence
6Interestingly, in the same week the EU (in collaboration with the UN) launched the ‘Spotlight initiative to eliminate vio-
lence against women and girls’, which, however is directed at the rest of the world outside the EU (https://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/news-and-events/press-release-eu-and-un-team-eliminate-violence-against-women-and-girls_en).
7Not all events listed on the Commission website were recorded, making it impossible to detect the audience composition
and topics discussed. Most events consist of a brief presentation by a commissioner or high-level commission ofﬁcial
followed by Q & A.
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away from supranational to intergovernmental actors, which, in combination with the un-
derlying market-oriented logic, makes access to policymaking more difﬁcult for actors pro-
moting gender equality (Walby, 2018). With the exception of the sixth, in all scenarios the
European Parliament, whose legitimacy is being contested in the Brexit campaign and by
populist politicians, and the Court of Justice are sidelined. In the past, the European Parlia-
ment and the Court of Justice played key roles in promoting and enforcing complex gender
equality policies, often supported by bottom-up subnational and transnational pressures,
mobilization and litigation (Ahrens andVan der Vleuten, 2019). In spite of the Commission
acting as the entrepreneur of norms, the White Paper hence seems to conﬁrm new
intergovernmentalist expectations in three respects (Bickerton et al., 2015). Firstly, mass
politics are taken seriously by preferring renationalization and citizens’ dialogues to su-
pra-nationalization and democratization. Secondly, intergovernmental actors are key
players. Thirdly, new institutions (like a common labour authority) are created instead of
strengthening existing ones. Although the institutional consequences are not further elabo-
rated in the scenarios, they seem unfavourable in bringing gender issues to the EU table.8
Apart from the European Commission and national governments, the scenarios strik-
ingly refer only to social partners and not to any other interest groups, civil society orga-
nizations or expert groups as relevant contributors to the future of Europe. Yet the latter
two were of utmost importance for EU gender equality policy (Jacquot 2015; Van der
Vleuten, 2007; Woodward 2004). Despite the EU recognition of the value of interest
groups to legitimize its activities, and despite the adaptation of participatory democracy
elements in the Lisbon Treaty (Sanchez Salgado, 2014), this is not addressed in any
scenario.
Conclusion
In this article, by employing a feminist institutionalist lens we have illustrated how gen-
der-blind policy proposals affect the prospects of gender equality. Feminist institutional-
ism illuminates the gendered nature of institutions but it has not hitherto been used to
predict the future institutionalization of gender equality. Combining the four dimensions
proposed by Gains and Lowndes (2014) with the gender impact assessment tool allowed
us to stretch feminist institutionalism to enable us to forecast the potential gendered ef-
fects of future EU institutional development and policy proposals instead of examining
them after they have been adopted. Furthermore, we paid particular attention to intersec-
tional aspects and the role of actors, as these two aspects have been so far underresearched
in institutionalist approaches.
Because of the EU treaty obligation to mainstream gender in all its policies, together
with gender equality as one of its founding values and the salience of gender issues to
the triple crisis hitting the EU, we would have expected that complex gender equality
would appear as a policy issue in all six scenarios for the future of Europe presented by
the European Commission in 2017 as well as its reﬂection papers; an expectation that
was not fulﬁlled. The scenarios do not explicitly refer to gender equality. Consistent with
the gender-blind construction of the EU future as a problem and the implicit gendered
8The White Paper follow up conﬁrms this tendency. At the informal Tallin summit (September 2017) the European Council
launched the Leaders’ Agenda, a work programme tackling contentious issues (migration, multiannual monetary frame-
work, monetary integration) in Council meetings – again, without any reference to gender equality.
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biases such as a deﬂationary bias and a hegemonic masculinity bias it contained, the so-
lutions proposed by the scenarios reﬂect this frame. We detected the ﬁrst feminist institu-
tionalist dimension, rules about gender equality, in two patterns: ﬁrstly, as
incidental gender-sensitive proposals inconsistent with the dominant logic of scenario
1; and secondly, in silencing (scenarios 3, 4 and 6) and potentially eliminating it (scenar-
ios 1 and 2). The second dimension, gendered biases, became apparent in the dominance
of a deﬂationary logic in the economic domain (scenarios 1, 2, 4 and 6) and a state-cen-
tric, hegemonic masculinity bias in the domain of security and violence (scenarios 1, 4
and 5). The third dimension examined whose voices were included in the diagnosis and
prognosis. The White Paper is powerfully state-centred, presenting the EU under threat
as a state-like actor in global politics, and referring in all scenarios to national govern-
ments as key actors, sometimes in cooperation with (national) social partners (scenarios
1 and 5). Other organized interests are silenced. Citizens are addressed as a set of neutral
beings without gender, class, ethnicity or other structural characteristics. Finally,
concerning the fourth dimension of policy outcomes, the forecast ranges from scenarios
that will probably exacerbate inequalities (scenario 2), will exacerbate inequalities selec-
tively (scenario 3) or will offer potential openings for complex gender equality as well as
serious risks for dismantling it (scenarios 1, 4, 5 and 6). Depending on which scenario is
adopted, the EU gender equality project would indeed make a U-turn or continue to alter-
nate between progress and stagnation, depending on the gendered power relations in the
supranational and intergovernmental arenas.
The question remains why the Commission deemed it appropriate not to include gen-
der equality. In their historical feminist institutionalist analysis of the EU gender equality
acquis, Debusscher and Van der Vleuten (2017) found that after critical junctures during
which (macro) economic and social instability disrupt the trajectory of the EU’s gender
equality efforts, it depends on the agency of the promoters of gender equality whether a
favourable change is brought about or a negative one thwarted. In a similar way, in her
analysis of the Lisbon Strategy and its successor, Europe 2020, Galligan (2017) ﬁnds that
a gender perspective ‘ﬂows in and out’ of EU politics depending on the push by ‘gender-
friendly’ actors and the institutional power plays that undergird the policy salience of gen-
der equality. Could this explain why gender equality has slipped off the table when the
future of European integration is discussed? Was it because the powerful actors at the ta-
ble did not have the commitment or knowledge to bring up gender mainstreaming, and
those who did have such a commitment or expertise lacked the power to overturn the
‘logic of appropriateness’ held by more powerful actors? Within the Commission it is
the case that most of the directorates-general (except those for justice, research and em-
ployment) have not assigned responsibility for mainstreaming gender. Furthermore, re-
search shows that gender equality actors are often perceived as disruptive, as ‘gender
police’, and that opposition to gender mainstreaming is common (Ahrens, 2018; Hubert
and Stratigaki, 2016; Jacquot, 2015). Or was it simply deemed appropriate to ignore gen-
der equality in a document about the future of the EU because gender mainstreaming is
considered a techno-bureaucratic exercise (Stratigaki, 2005) which does not ﬁt into a ‘vi-
sionary’ document such as the White Paper? Whatever the case, the European Commis-
sion found examples of gendered inequalities to be less appropriate than the inequality
in product quality (ﬁsh ﬁngers) and access to services (vaccines). In fact, the latter are ex-
amples of non-compliance with existing rules and regulations and enforcement does not
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upset the internal market logic which constitutes the core of the EU; while gender inequal-
ities are contested and dealing with them would upset that very internal market logic.
None of the scenarios supports a transformation in that direction, despite Juncker’s aim
to ‘restore the myth of the EU as a community of values’ (Pansardi and Battegazzorre,
2018, p. 16).
Notes on contributors
Petra Ahrens is Guest Professor in Comparative Politics and Gender & Diversity at
the University of Antwerp, where she held a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship
(2017–2018), and Senior Researcher at the University of Tampere. Her research focuses
on European integration, gender equality policies, public policy and transnational civil so-
ciety organizations. She has published widely on EU gender equality policies and is the
author of Actors, Institutions, and the Making of EU Gender Equality Programs (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2018).
Anna van der Vleuten is Professor of Contesting Europeanization at Radboud Univer-
sity. Her research focuses on the EU, gender equality policies, lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender rights and supranational courts, and comparative regionalism (Southern Afri-
can Development Community, Mercado Común del Sur). She has published widely on
these topics, including a monograph (The Price of Gender Equality. Member States and
Governance in the European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007).
Correspondence: Anna van der Vleuten, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University,
PO Box 9108, 6500 HK, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
email: a.vandervleuten@fm.ru.nl
References
Abels, G. (2012) ‘Research by, for and about Women: Gendering Science and Research Policy’. In
Abels, G. and Mushaben, J. (eds) Gendering the European Union: New Approaches to Old
Democratic Deﬁcits (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 187–207.
Ahrens, P. (2018) Actors, Institutions and the Making of EU Gender Equality Programs
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
Ahrens, P. (2019) ‘The Birth, Life, and Death of Policy Instruments: 35 Years of EU Gender
Equality Policy Programmes’. West European Politics, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 45–66.
Ahrens, P. &Abels, G. (2017) ‘Die Macht zu Gestalten – die Mutterschutzrichtlinie im legislativen
Bermuda-Dreieck der Europäischen Union’. Femina Politica, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 26–41.
Ahrens, P. and Van der Vleuten, A. (2019) ‘EU Gender Equality Policies and Politics – New
Modes of Governance’. In Bauschke-Urban, C. and Jungwirth, I. (eds) Gender and Diversity
Studies in European Perspectives (Barbara Budrich: Opladen).
Askola, H. (2007) ‘Violence against Women, Trafﬁcking, and Migration in the European Union’.
European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 204–17.
Begg, I. (2017) ‘The Commission’s White Paper on the Future of Europe – A Case of What Might
Have Been…’. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog, 8 March Available online
at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/03/08/the-commissions-white-paper-on-the-future-
of-europe-a-case-of-what-might-have-been/. Last accessed 3 September 2018.
Beveridge, F. and Cengiz, F. (2015) The EU Budget for Gender Equality, Analytical Study (Brus-
sels: European Parliament).
Petra Ahrens and Anna van der Vleuten14
© 2019 The Authors JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Bickerton, C.J., Hodson, D. and Puetter, U. (2015) ‘The New Intergovernmentalism. European In-
tegration in the Post-Maastricht Era’. JCMS, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 703–22.
Bruff, I. and Wöhl, S. (2016) ‘Constitutionalizing Austerity, Disciplining the Household: Mascu-
line Norms of Competitiveness and the Crisis of Social Reproduction in the Eurozone’. In
Hozić, A. and True, J. (eds) Scandalous Economics: Gender and the Politics of Financial Cri-
ses (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 92–108.
Debusscher, P. and Van der Vleuten, A. (2017) ‘Equality Policies in the EU through a Feminist
Historical Institutionalist Lens’. In MacRae, H. and Weiner, E. (eds) Towards Gendering Insti-
tutionalism. Equality in Europe (Lanham: Rowman and Littleﬁeld), pp. 3–24.
Elman, R.A. (1996) Sexual Politics and the European Union: The New Feminist Challenge (New
York: Berghahn).
European Commission (2014) ’A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness
and Democratic Change. Political Guidelines for the next European Commission’. Available
online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/president-junckers-political-guide-
lines_en. Last accessed 12 August 2019.
European Commission (2017a) ‘The Future of Europe – Reﬂections and Scenarios for the EU27
by 2025’. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ﬁles/white_
paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf. Last accessed 3 September 2018.
European Commission (2017b) ‘President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address
2017’. 13 September. Available online at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-
3165_en.htm. Last accessed 3 August 2019.
European Commission (2017c) ‘Reﬂection Paper on the Social Dimension’. COM(2017)206, 26
April. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ﬁles/reﬂection-
paper-social-dimension-europe_en.pdf. Last accessed 3 September 2018.
European Commission (2017d) ‘Reﬂection Paper on Harnessing Globalisation’. COM(2017)240,
10 May. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ﬁles/reﬂec-
tion-paper-globalisation_en.pdf. Last accessed 3 September 2018.
European Commission (2017e) ‘Reﬂection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Mone-
tary Union’. COM(2017)291, 31 May. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
sites/beta-political/ﬁles/reﬂection-paper-emu_en.pdf. Last accessed 3 September 2018.
European Commission (2017f) ‘Reﬂection Paper on the Future of European Defence’.
COM(2017)315, 7 June. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-polit-
ical/ﬁles/reﬂection-paper-defence_en.pdf. Last accessed 3 September 2018.
European Commission (2017g) ‘Reﬂection Paper on the Future of EU Finances’. COM(2017)358,
28 June. Available online at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/ﬁles/reﬂec-
tion-paper-eu-ﬁnances_en.pdf. Last accessed 3 September 2018.
European Council (2016) ’The Bratislava Declaration’. Available online at: https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/media/21250/160916-bratislava-declaration-and-roadmapen16.pdf. Last
accessed 12 August 2019.
European Council (2018) ‘Leaders’ Agenda. February MMF Debate’. Available online at: http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21594/leaders-agenda.pdf. Last accessed 3 September 2018.
European Institute for Gender Equality (2016) Gender Impact Assessment, Gender Mainstreaming
Toolkit. Available online at: http://eige.europa.eu/sites/default/ﬁles/eige_gender_impact_as-
sessment_gender_mainstreaming_toolkit.pdf. Last accessed 3 September 2018.
Eurostat (2017) ‘SDG 10. Reduced Inequalities (Statistical Annex)’. Available online at: http://ec.
europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/SDG_10_-_Reduced_inequalities_(statisti-
cal_annex). Last accessed 3 September 2018.
Freedman, J. (2017) ‘Mainstreaming Gender in EU Immigration and Asylum Policy’. In MacRae,
H. and Weiner, E. (eds) Towards Gendering Institutionalism. Equality in Europe (London,
New York: Rowman & Littleﬁeld), pp. 145–64.
Fish ﬁngers and measles? 15
© 2019 The Authors JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Gains, F. and Lowndes, V. (2014) ‘How is Institutional Formation Gendered, and Does it Make a
Difference? A New Conceptual Framework and a Case Study of Police and Crime Commis-
sioners in England and Wales’. Politics & Gender, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 524–48.
Galligan, Y. (2017) ‘Filtering out, Filtering in: What Place for Gender in European Economic
Plans?’ In MacRae, H. and Weiner, E. (eds) Towards Gendering Institutionalism. Equality in
Europe (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld), pp. 1–16.
Guerrina, R. and Masselot, A. (2018) ‘Walking into the Footprint of EU Law: Unpacking the Gen-
dered Consequences of Brexit’. Social Policy & Society, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 319–30.
Hubert, A. (2012) ‘Gendering Employment Policy: From Equal Pay to Work–life Balance’. In
Abels, G. and Mushaben, J. (eds) Gendering the European Union: New Approaches to Old
Democratic Deﬁcits (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 146–68.
Hubert, A. & Stratigaki, M. (2016) ‘Twenty Years of EU Gender Mainstreaming: Rebirth out of
the Ashes?’ Femina Politica, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 21–36.
Jacquot, S. (2015) Transformations in EU Gender Equality. From Emergence to Dismantling
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
Jupille, J. and Caporaso, J. (1999) ‘Institutionalism and the European Union; Beyond International
Relations and Comparative Politics’. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, pp. 429–44.
Kantola, J. and Lombardo, E. (eds) (2017) Gender and the Economic Crisis in Europe. Politics,
Institutions and Intersectionality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
Karamessini, M. and Rubery, J. (eds) (2014) Women and Austerity. The Economic Crisis and the
Future for Gender Equality (London and New York: Routledge).
Klatzer, E. and Schlager, C. (2017) ‘The Gendered Nature of Economic Governance Institutions
and Policies in the EU: A Key Battleground for Gender Equality’. In MacRae, H. and Weiner,
E. (eds) Towards Gendering Institutionalism. Equality in Europe (Lanham: Rowman &
Littleﬁeld), pp. 165–82.
Kuhar, R. and Paternotte, D. (eds) (2017) Anti-gender Campaigns in Europe. Mobilizing against
Equality (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld).
MacRae, H. and Weiner, E. (2017a) ‘Conclusion’. In MacRae, H. and Weiner, E. (eds) Towards
Gendering Institutionalism. Equality in Europe (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld), pp. 207–14.
Muehlenhoff, H.L.M. (2017) ‘Victims, Soldiers, Peace-makers and Caretakers: The Neoliberal
Constitution of Women in the EU’s Security Policy’. International Feminist Journal of Poli-
tics, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 153–67.
Pansardi, P. and Battegazzorre, F. (2018) ‘The Discursive Legitimation Strategies of the President
of the Commission: A Qualitative Content Analysis of the State of the Union Addresses
(SOTEU)’. Journal of European Integration, Vol. 40, No. 7, pp. 853–87.
Plomien, A. (2018) ‘EU Social and Gender Policy beyond Brexit: Towards the European Pillar of
Social Rights’. Social Policy and Society, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 281–96.
Radaelli, C.M. and Meuwese, A.C.M. (2010) ‘Hard Questions, Hard Solutions: Proceduralisation
through Impact Assessment in the EU’. West European Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 136–53.
Sanchez Salgado, R. (2014) Europeanizing Civil Society. How the EU shapes Civil Society Orga-
nizations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
Spierings, N. and Zaslove, A. (2017) ‘Gender, Populist Attitudes, and Voting: Explaining the Gen-
der Gap in Voting for Populist Radical Right and Populist Radical Left Parties’.West European
Politics, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 821–47.
Stratigaki, M. (2005) ‘Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action: An On-going Conﬂict in EU
Gender Equality Policy’. European Journal of Women’s Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 165–86.
Stratigaki, M. (2012) ‘Gendering the Social Policy Agenda: Anti-discrimination, Social Inclusion
and Social Protection’. In Abels, G. and Mushaben, J. (eds) Gendering the European Union:
New Approaches to Old Democratic Deﬁcits (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 169–86.
Van der Vleuten, A. (2007) The Price of Gender Equality (Aldershot: Ashgate).
Petra Ahrens and Anna van der Vleuten16
© 2019 The Authors JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Verloo, M. (ed.) (2018) Varieties of Opposition to Gender Equality in Europe. Theory, Evidence
and Practice (New York: Routledge).
Verloo, M. and Roggeband, C. (1996) ‘Gender Impact Assessment: The Development of a New
Instrument in the Netherlands’. Impact Assessment, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 3–20.
Verloo, M. and Walby, S. (2012) ‘Introduction: The Implications for Theory and Practice of Com-
paring the Treatment of Intersectionality in the Equality Architecture in Europe’. Social
Politics, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 433–45.
Walby, S. (2015) Crisis (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell).
Walby, S. (2018) ‘Gender in the Crisis and Remaking of Europe: Re-gendering Subsidiarity’. Eu-
ropean Journal of Politics and Gender, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 307–24.
Waylen, G. (2009) ‘What Can Historical Institutionalism Offer Feminist Institutionalists?’ Politics
& Gender, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 245–53.
Weiner, E. and MacRae, H. (2016) ‘Opportunity and Setback? Gender Equality, Crisis and Change
in the EU’. In Kantola, J. and Lombardo, E. (eds) Gender and the Economic Crisis in Europe.
Politics, Institutions and Intersectionality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 73–94.
Weiner, E. and MacRae, H. (2017) ‘Introduction’. In MacRae, H. and Weiner, E. (eds) Towards
Gendering Institutionalism. Equality in Europe (Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld), pp. xv–xxxi.
Woodward, A.E. (2004) ‘Building Velvet Triangles: Gender and Informal Governance’. In
Christiansen, T. (ed.) Informal Governance in the European Union (Cheltenham: Elgar),
pp. 76–93.
Fish ﬁngers and measles? 17
© 2019 The Authors JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
